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The goal of this paper is to provide the elements of a unitary analytical framework
that incorporates the findings of two bodies of literature which, so far, have
developed independently: comparative models of the political economy that
distinguish between coordinated and uncoordinated market economies and
comparative models of social policy. While sharing the emphasis on firm behaviour
of the first models, the paper attempts to build a micro-logic into comparative models
of social policy, in order to overcome the functionalist character of these analyses.
By using combined insights from both models and by specifying the ‘micro-
regulatory’ role of the welfare regimes and the impact of welfare regimes on firm
adjustment, we can explain cross-national differences in the changes of the
institutions situated at the interface between the welfare state and firms during the
1980’s and cross-national differences in the mix between employment and non-
employment.
Zusammenfassung
Ziel des Papiers ist es, Elemente für einen einheitlichen Analyse-Rahmen zu
entwickeln, der Ergebnisse zweier unterschiedlicher Stränge der Forschungsliteratur
aufgreift, die bis jetzt unabhängig voneinander entwickelt worden sind: es geht zum
einen um die vergleichenden Modelle der politischen Ökonomie, die zwischen
koordinierten und unkoordinierten Marktwirtschaften unterscheiden und zum anderen
um vergleichende Modelle bezogen auf  Sozialpolitik. Von den erstgenannten
Modellen wird die Fokussierung auf das Verhalten von Unternehmen übernommen,
denn es geht um den Einbau einer „Mikro-Logik“ in die Modelle zur Analyse von
Sozialpolitik. Damit soll der funktionalistische Charakter dieser Analysen überwunden
werden.
Durch die Kombination von Ergebnissen beider Modelle und durch eine genaue
Analyse der „mikro-regulatorischen“ Rolle wohlfahrtsstaatlicher  Regelungen sowie
deren Bedeutung auf Anpassungsprozesse von Unternehmen können Unterschiede
zwischen verschiedenen Ländern bei der Veränderung der Institutionen an der
Nahtstelle des Wohlfahrtsstaats und der Unternehmen während der achtziger Jahre
und Unterschiede in der Verteilung von Beschäftigung und Arbeitslosigkeit erklärt
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1 which was prompted by the OECD technical labor market
report entitled ‘Flexibility in the Labor Market’
2 is almost ten years old. European
dismissal laws were at the center of these debates. The social protection
against the sudden termination of the employment contract enjoyed by
European workers was viewed as the primary cause of the ‘rigidity’ and
‘sclerosis’ of the European labor markets and for the persistence of high
unemployment in Europe, as compared to the United States. ‘Deregulation’ of
the labor markets -- understood, in a narrow sense as the weakening of the
dismissal laws and broadly as the removal of any form of ‘social’ protection that
inhibits firms’ ‘flexible’ use of their labor market inputs -- was viewed by
employers and policy-makers alike as the all-promising cure that could remedy
the unemployment ills.
After almost ten years, the debate about the possibilities of reconciliation at
the firm level between the demands of social protection and economic flexibility
still continues
3. However, a number of empirical developments have muddled
what was once considered a well-understood trade-off between economic
flexibility and social policies. Consider the following facts. Despite the
weakening of the dismissal laws in several European countries -- Germany,
Italy, France and the UK -- European unemployment has failed to decrease.
4
Macroeconomic labor market prospects in Europe have failed to improve during
the early 1990’s: in 1994 total unemployment in Europe totaled 35 million, an
increase of 10 million over the levels of unemployment of 1990
5. In some
countries, such as Germany, the change in employment security regulations
                                                          
1 Comprehensive summaries of the debates and of the flexibility literature can be found in Rein, Martin and Friedman,
B. L., 1992, Social Protection and Economic Change, Cambridge: MIT Press, Jessop, B., et. al., 1991, The politics of
flexibility: Restructuring State and Industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia, Worcester: Billing and Sons, Rebecca
M. Blank, ed., 1994, Social Protection versus economic flexibility: Is there a trade-off?, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press. For some clarifications on the concept of flexibility, see, among others, Piore Michael, 1986,
Perspectives on Labor Market Flexibility, Industrial Relations, 25: 1986, pp. 146- 167
2 OECD, 1986, Flexibility in the Labor Market: The Current Debate. A Technical Report, Paris: OECD. Among other
influential reports advocating similar policies, see OECD, 1990, Labor Market Policies for the 1990’s, Paris: OECD.
3 For a summary of the positions in the debate, see Richard B. Freeman and Rebecca M. Blank, 1993, Evaluating the
connection between social protection and economic flexibility, Cambridge: MA, National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper.
4 For a review of the changes to the dismissal laws see the articles in Christoph F. Büchtemann, ed., 1993,
Employment Security and Labor Market Behavior: Interdisciplinary Approaches and international evidence, Itthaca: ILR
Press.
5 OECD, 1994, The OCED Jobs Study, Paris: OECD.2
had a very low impact on the hiring and firing behavior of German firms
6. The
weakening of the dismissal laws has been accompanied, in many European
countries by an increase of firms’ use of the instruments of the welfare state:
early retirement, work-sharing and part-time work (that is subsidized by
unemployment insurance benefits) being the most significant examples. These
policies which, based on some estimates, provide benefits to over 20 million
people across OECD countries emerged as an unintended consequence of
labor market deregulation and remain unexplained by the flexibility literature. As
these empirical developments suggest, the institutional mechanisms that link
employment security regulations to unemployment via firm behavior and the
welfare state to firms are still insufficiently understood.
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the specification of the relationship
between employment security regulations, labor market policies of firms and a
number of labor market outcomes, such as patterns of labor market
segmentation, labor force participation and unemployment rates. It will do so,
by integrating the analysis of dismissal laws into the broader institutional
environment, by making use of categories and propositions developed within
institutional models of the political economy and models of the welfare state
7
and by focusing on the relationship between dismissal laws and other social
policy instruments that are available to firms. With the use of these models, I
intend to respecify the micro-regulatory function of the welfare state and the
impact of welfare regimes on firm adjustment.  I will attempt to distinguish
among the circumstances under which deregulation of dismissal laws was
successful and explain the causes of this success (by pointing out the broader
macro-institutional environment that has facilitated successful labor market
deregulation) and those circumstances in which attempts of employers and
policy-makers towards deregulation of the labor markets had as their
unintended consequences the increased use by firms of the instruments of the
welfare state.
This theoretical framework will be then used to explain cross-national
variation in the patterns of firm-welfare state interaction, during the 1980’s. I will
point to an important mechanism of institutional interaction between welfare
regimes and institutions of business coordination that operates via firm behavior
                                                          
6 A point repeatedly made by Christoph F. Büchtemann. See, for example, Does (De)Regulation matter? Employment
Protection in West Germany, in Egon Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., 1991, Beyond Keynesianism: The Socio-
Economics of Production and Full-Employment, London: Edward Elgar, pp. 111- 37; Büchtemann, Christoph and
Quack, Sigrid, 1989, ‘Bridges’ or ‘Traps’? Non-Standard Employment in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Gerry and
Janine Rodgers, eds., 1989, Precarious jobs in labor market regulation: The growth of atypical employment in Western
Europe, Brussels: ILO Publications.
7 A similar suggestion -- for the improvement of our understanding of the impact of social protection programs has been
put forward by Richard Freeman. “ There is a need to analyze the effects of specific programs within the ‘general
equilibrium’ of social and market institutions. The impact of any program depends on the environment of institutions in
which it is located. [...] Multiple and simultaneous programs can have offsetting behavioral incentives or can reinforce
each other in ways that create synergies, so that the effect of several programs together may be different from any
individual program alone. [...] Programs that are distortionary in isolation may not be distortionary when viewed in a
broader systemic context.” In Freeman, 1993, op. cit., p. 26.3
and to a new political dynamics of social policy development during the 1980’s
that has resulted from the growing access of enterprises to the instruments of
social policy. What explains cross-national variation in the mode in which firms
have gained access to the resources of the welfare state and in their ability to
use social policies for the purposes of enterprise reorganization? What explains
differential degree in the ability of firms to shift some of the burden of
adjustment and reorganization to the state? More importantly, however, what
are the labor market consequences of these developments? Why have most of
these policies ended up offering nothing more than a surrogate experience of
work to the participants involved (part-time work, work-sharing schemes) or just
a ‘dignified’ form of labor market non-participation (early retirement) as an
alternative to unemployment ? What are the mechanisms by which these social
policies reinforced the institutionalized advantages of labor market insiders over
labor market outsiders -- instead of overcoming some of the structural problems
of European labor markets (long duration of unemployment spells, high
percentage of long-term unemployment out of total unemployment, low labor
force participation rates of certain labor market groups)?
By focusing on these dimensions of social policy development that are
shaped by firms’ use of social policies and by emphasizing this micro-macro
linkage, I attempt to contribute to the growing literature that examines the
institutional interaction between comparative models of the political economy
and comparative models of social policy. First, this analysis attempts to build a
micro-logic into existing models of welfare regimes
8 in order to overcome the
functionalist bend of these analyses. Esping-Andersen conceptualizes the
tendency of welfare regimes to maximize (universalistic) or minimize
(conservative) labor force participation rates as expression of the ‘latent’
institutional logics of these regimes, without specifying the causes of these
differences and without a consistent micro-logic
9. The turn to these functionalist
arguments that hypothesize differences in ‘labor market logics’ among the three
different welfare regimes is a result of the failure of simple versions of
institutional arguments to account for the vast differences in labor market
outcomes: there are no major differences between Sweden and Germany in the
institutional rules that specify the conditions of exit from the labor market via
early retirement
10, yet, in terms of labor market outcomes, the two countries are
                                                          
8 Gøsta-Esping Andersen, 1990, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9 Why do universal welfare regimes maximize total labor force participation rates, while conservative welfare regimes
minimize them, Gøsta Esping Andersen would, I think, offer two answers. One is pure definitional: i.e. these differences
are the characteristic attributes of these regimes. The second answer is more complex and refers to the Baumol model.
The implicit institutional logic of welfare regimes is a result of the solutions to the problem of uneven growth in
productivity between the manufacturing and service sector. See Gøsta Esping Andersen, 1990, op. cit., Chapter 8, p.
194.
10 An observation made by Martin Kohli and Martin Rein, 1991, The Changing Balance of Work and Retirement, in
Kohli, Martin et.al, eds., 1991, Time for Retirement: Comparative Studies of Early Exit From the Labor Force,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 9 “Countries like Sweden have almost all the supporting legislation needed
to produce early exit, but nevertheless do not show the same rates as, for example, Germany, France and the
Netherlands.”4
situated at the extreme points.  Second, an analysis of firms as agents of social
policy development is totally absent from comparative welfare state studies
11 --
a surprising omission, given the crucial role firms play in defining the terms of
the employment relationship and the given the close relationship that exists
between the organization of the internal labor markets
12 and the mode in which
firms rely on the external labor markets during periods of economic downturns,
between the organization of the employment relationship within firms (patterns
of job tenure) and patterns of labor market exclusion.  A number of recent
social policy developments that the welfare regime literature has attempted to
explain (such as cross-national variation in early retirement) cannot be
accounted for, without an understanding of the large role played by firms in
shaping these developments
13 and without an analysis of the growing access of
firms to a number of instruments of social policy. Third, the micro-macro linkage
of firms-welfare states interactions can, potentially account for some of the
stratificational outcomes of coordinated market economies by linking the
analysis of the variation among different forms of non-employment that the
comparative welfare regimes literature has initiated to a comparative analysis of
differences in the patterns of employment (cross national differences in job
tenures, in security of employment etc.) that the comparative political
economists have identified.
2. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LABOR MARKET
DEREGULATION: AN OVERVIEW
A 1985 survey of employers, conducted by the international employers
association (IOE) attempted to rank the significance of obstacles to the
termination of employment contracts
14 based on assessment of employers.
                                                          
11 There are, of course a few exceptions. A recent analysis that attempts to integrate an analysis of production regimes
with models of welfare state development can be found in Frieder Naschold and Bert de Vroom, eds., 1994, Regulating
Employment and Welfare. Company and National Policies of Labor Force Participation Rates at the End of Worklife in
Industrial Countries, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, Chapters 1 and 10.
12 By internal labor markets, I refer to the specification of job classifications and seniority ladders and the benefits,
wages and rights attached to each segment within these ladders. See Peter B. Doeringer and Michael Piore, 1971,
Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, pp. 13- 34; Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, 1982, Modern
Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy.
13 The fact that differences in early retirement cannot be explained through an anlysis that focuses on social policy
alone has been indirectly affirmed by Gøsta Esping Andersen and Jan Eivind Kolberg: “Cross-national variations in the
scope of early retirement are increasingly large and have increased over the past decades. At present we can offer
rather speculative hypotheses concerning international variations in the exit of older workers.” Gøsta Esping-Andersen
and Jon Eivind Kolberg, Welfare Regimes and Employment Regimes, in Kolberg, Jon Eivind, ed., 1992a, Between
Work and Social Citizenship, London: Sharpe, pp. 14-15
14 The results of this survey of the International Organization of Employers (Adapting the Labor Market) can be found in
Emerson, Michael, 1988, Regulation or deregulation of the labor market: Policy regimes for the recruitment and
Dismissal of employees in the Industrialized countries, European Economic Review, 32: 1988, pp. 775- 817.5
Since dismissal laws consist of very sophisticated (and, often obscure) legal
and procedural rules, cross-national comparability as well as the formulation of
indexes that make possible an econometric estimation of the impact of these
legal frameworks is extremely difficult
15. The results of this survey can be used
as a preliminary comparative assessment of the institutional impact of these
rules.
TABLE 1
Importance of Obstacles to the Termination of Employment Contracts
16











3. Obstacles are minor Denmark
Finland
4. Obstacles are insignificant United Kingdom
                                                                                                                                                                         
15 On attempts to develop statistical tests, see Mosley, Hugh and Kruppe, 1992, Employment Protection and Labor
Force Adjustment: A Comparative Evaluation, Discussion Paper, FS I 92-9, Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung,
Berlin.
16 Source: International Organization of Employers quoted in Emerson, Michael, 1988, Regulation or Deregulation of
the Labor Markets, European Economic Review, 1988: 32, p. 791; Büchtemann, Christoph F., 1991, Employment
Security and Labor Markets: Assumptions, International Evidence and Theoretical Implications, Discussion Paper, FS I
91- 1, April 1991, Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung, Berlin, p. 56; For similar results see Bertola, B., 1990,
Job Security, Employment and Wages, European Economic Review, 1990, pp. 851- 886.6
The arguments favoring more economic flexibility that would result from a
weakening of the social constraints imposed by dismissal laws on the
enterprises have formulated a number of empirical propositions. On the one
hand, they predict that a more rapid and thorough ‘deregulation’ (understood as
a weakening of the institutional obstacles on the hiring and firing of workers)
would occur in countries with higher levels of social protection against
dismissal.  Second, they predict that, once these institutional barriers to the
hiring and firing of workers are removed, one should observe cross-national
similarities in the labor market adjustments of firms during economic downturns,
consisting in an increase in the number of  layoffs and temporary layoffs during
economic downturns. As a consequence of the more rapid adjustment of firms’
employment policies, economies with lower levels of employment security
should be characterized by lower levels of unemployment.
However, most of these propositions have been disconfirmed by the labor
market developments that followed the weakening of the dismissal laws in
several European countries.  Germany, a country that ranks highest on the IOE
index has introduced only minor changes in its employment security
regulations: the most important being the change to the employment promotion
act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) in 1985 allowing for fixed-term contracts.
17 As
existing studies measuring the impact of these changes have indicated, these
transformations had as a result an even more modest impact on the hiring and
firing behavior of German firms.
18 What has accompanied these timid attempts
towards labor market deregulation has been, however, a greater reliance by
firms on the instruments of the welfare state and a greater use of social policy
for labor market purposes: most notably being an increase in firms’ use of
unemployment insurance to subsidize of short-time work and the growth of
early retirement.
In contrast to Germany, labor market deregulation in France has been
more successful. In this case, however, employment security regulations were
not linked to firms training needs and were imposed on firms externally via
administrative decisions. The authorization of dismissal for economic reasons
rested, after 1975, with the government (the Work Inspection Office) -- which
was ‘micro-managing’ the labor market by monitoring, and influencing the mode
of selection by enterprises of their redundant workers. This requirement of
administrative authorization of dismissals (Authorisation Administrative) was
abolished in 1986, after the Chirac II government gave in to complaints by the
                                                          
17 Mückenberger, Ulrich, 1990, Zur Rolle des Normalarbeitsverhaltnisses bei der Sozialstaatlichen Umverteilung von
Risiken, in Christoph F. Büchtemann and Helmut Neumann, eds., 1990, Mehr Arbeit durch weniger Recht? Chancen
und Risiken der Arbeitsmarktsflexibilisierung, Berlin: Sigma.
18 For example, Mosley and Kruppe conclude that “the net employment effects (of the 1985 changes) were small due to
substitution and dead-weight. The reform is in fact estimated to have induced only ca. 230,000 additional fixed term
employment contracts. No evidence was found for the substitution of fixed-term contracts for overtime.” The same
study concludes that the increase in the percentage of fixed-term contracts as a total of the structure of German
employment was only a modest 1.8 %, from 4% in 1984 to 5.8% in 1985. Mosley and Kruppe, op. cit., p. 85.7
Conseil National du Patronat Français and eliminated all statutory regulations
concerning dismissals on economic grounds
19. In opposition to Germany, short-
time work in France is much more limited (these programs covered only, on
average, 45.000 employees per year). France shares with Germany the low
labor force participation rates of males age 55-65 that has been a consequence
of the development of early retirement, yet it differs in the policy instruments
through which early retirement has been achieved.
The comparative analysis of this paper attempts to explain these cross-
national differences and to account for these unintended consequences of
labor market deregulation. None of the policy changes can be understood in
isolation and without a consideration of the broader institutional environment
and specifying the relationship between alternative social policies that are
available to firms. Despite the tremendous variation across the national cases
in the character of firm-welfare state interaction, in both cases, the increased
access of firms to the instruments of social policy has been the result of the
ability of the enterprises to reinterpret existing policy instruments of the welfare
states in order to devise alternative forms of non-employment which could
substitute for the reliance on the external labor market that labor market
deregulation intended to achieve.
3. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF FIRMS-WELFARE STATE
INTERACTION
What explains the cross-national differences in the mode of labor market
adjustment of firms during economic downturns, i.e. their choice among
alternative policies such as layoffs, early retirement policies or policies that
subsidize participation in work, via work-sharing or short-time work? What
explains cross-national differences in the degree of access to the institutions of
the welfare state gained by firms during the 1980’s ? This paper makes two
general propositions. The first is the observation that cross-national differences
in the mode the welfare state has been used by firms to facilitate firm-level
adjustment exist. These differences can be modeled, if the institutional
constraints on firms set by two macro-institutional environments are specified:
the institutions of business coordination
20 (that influence the level of long-term
                                                          
19 Maurau, Guy, Regulation, Deregulation and Labor Market Dynamics: The Case of France, in Büchtemann, C. F., ed.,
op. cit., 1993, pp. 358- 374; Mosley, Hugh and Kruppe, Thomas, op. cit., p. 72.
20 In my reformulation of David Soskice’s model, institutions of business coordination are institutional arenas which
increase the strategic capacity of business, inducing firms to converge upon a pattern of production and trade that
offers cumulative advantages that are not predetermined by preexisting factor endowments, while, simultaneously,
compensating for the risks of innovative product market strategies. Characteristic of these institutional arenas is that
they “provide a forum for strategic discussion and the development of common positions” and that they have both
access to inside information of firms together with a sanctioning capacity against the firms that do not adhere to the
strategic positions of the organization. See David Soskice, 1994, National Patterns in Company Innovation Strategies:
A Comparative Institutional Advantage Approach, manuscript, Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung Berlin;8
investment in human capital and the mix between general and firm-based
training) and the character of the welfare regime, which can be viewed as
‘repertoire’ of policy instruments that are available to firms. I will attempt to
distinguish among several distinct logics of firm-welfare state-interactions, i.e.
broad strategies of firms use of different social policies during periods of
economic adjustment. The second proposition is that these different micro-
logics by which firm development has been combined with social policy
development can account for different labor market outcomes across the cases,
in particular for differences in labor market outcomes such as: mix between
unemployment and other forms of non-employment; differences in the number
of unemployment spells per worker and in the duration of unemployment spells
across these economies.
                                                                                                                                                                         
Soskice, David, 1990a, Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrial Countries,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6: 4, pp. 36- 61; Soskice David, 1990b, Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining
Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies, in Renatto Brunetta and Carlo Dell’Ariga, eds.,
Labor Relations and Economic Performance, New York: New York University Press.9
TABLE 2
Hypothesized patterns of firms-welfare state interaction and social
policies used by firms based on constraints imposed by the institutions of
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On the one hand, in uncoordinated market economies, the low degree of
business coordination has as its consequence a low level of investment in firm-
level training and is associated with lower job tenures (Table 3) and a high
mobility of workers across firms. Since in this institutional environment mobility
of workers across firms has no adverse implications on levels of firm-based
training, for employers in these economies, one expects employers in these
countries to perceive dismissal laws as unnecessary barriers and ‘rigidities’ that
inhibit a more flexible use of their manpower.  Similarly, during economic
downturns, one expects firms to rely on layoffs and temporary layoffs as their
dominant labor market strategy and one expects a movement of workers in and
out of unemployment, leading to a higher number of spells of unemployment
per worker, as compared to coordinated market economies. Alternative uses of
social policy to facilitate firms level adjustment, such as work-sharing or early
retirement are rather exceptional for the ‘average’ firm in these economies.
Given the ‘residualist’ character of the welfare regime one expects a low level of
public spending on public policies that facilitate labor market adjustment,  such
as early retirement schemes.
TABLE 3
JOB TENURES IN OECD COUNTRIES
21

















Australia 22.3 6.5 22.9 6.6 27.9 6.5 21.4 6.8
Canada 26.2 7.3 26.6 7.6 27.3 7.4 23.5 7.8
Finland 17.0 7.8 18.4 8.4 22.2 8.0 11.9 9.0
France ... ... 13.1 10.7 ... ... 15.7 10.1
German
y
... ... 8.5 11.1 18.2 10.3 12.8 10.4
Japan 10.6 8.9 9.4 10.3 9.4 10.8 9.8 10.9
Netherla
nd
... ... 11.7 8.9 ... ... 24.0 7.0
Spain ... ... 15.2 11.2 ... ... 23.9 9.8
UK ... ... 18.0 8.3 21.5 7.8 18.6 7.9
US 29.3 6.4 28.9 6.7 29.7 6.8 28.8 6.7
                                                          
21Source, OECD, The Jobs Study, 1994, Paris: OECD.11
A vast amount of econometric evidence has been accumulated to point that the
labor market adjustment of firms in non-coordinated market economies with
liberal welfare regimes such as the US and the UK can be approximated by the
simple empirical predictions of this model, which parallels, in its broad
characteristics the standard description of labor market found in economics
textbooks. By using dynamic labor market demand  model that estimates the
change in labor inputs by firms (across the same industries) but in different
institutional environments, it has been estimated that American firms adjust
more rapidly their employment levels than European firms, despite the
existence of tax disincentives for US employers to lay off workers, whereas
European firms (in particular German and French firms) adjust the average
hours per worker
22. But the situation encountered in uncoordinated market
economies with liberal welfare regimes is rather exceptional. For most other
European economies, we can identify several different patterns of welfare
state-labor market interaction during the 1980’s.
Coordinated market economies are characterized by a combination of high
levels of training of the workforce (consisting of both general training provided
by the institutions of vocational training and firm-level training). If linked to the
policies of firm-level training, dismissal laws are viewed by employers as a part
of the institutional environment that prevents the mobility of workers across
firms. During periods of economic downturns, enterprises will attempt to
decrease the movement in and out of unemployment that may potentially
undermine the investment of employers in the skills of their employees. Thus,
one expects to find in these economies higher job tenures associated with a
lower number of spells of unemployment per worker, but one expects the
duration of the unemployment spell to be longer than in uncoordinated market
economies. (Table 4)  Rather than relying on a mixture of layoffs and temporary
layoffs as the dominant labor market strategy, enterprises in these economies
turn to the welfare states in search for labor market instruments that are
alternatives to layoffs: these ‘strategies’, in turn, lead to significant changes in
the character of social policy itself.
But firms adjustment strategies during periods of economic downturns are
conditioned by the character of the welfare regime, as well. Prior economic
models have assumed that the level of unemployment benefits is the most
significant variable that determines the levels of unemployment
23. These
                                                          
22 Susan N. Houseman and Katherine L. Abraham, 1993a, Labor Adjustment under different Institutional Structures: A
case study of Germany and the United States, NBER Working Paper no. 4548; Katherine G. Abraham and Susan N.
Houseman, 1993 b, Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility? Lessons from Germany, France and
Belgium, NBER Working Paper no. 4390; Abraham, K. and S. N. Houseman, 1993, Job Security in America: Lessons
from Germany, Washington: Brookings Institution; Houseman, S. N., 1991, Industrial Restructuring with job security:
The case of European Steel, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
23 A representative text is Layard, R., et. al., 1991, Unemployment, Macroeconomic Performance and the Labor
Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Elements of a critique can be found in Atkinson, Anthony B., and Micklewright,
John, 1991, Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review, Journal of Economic
Literature, 29: 1991, pp. 1679- 1727.12
models, however, fail to account for alternative forms of non-employment
(totaling almost 20 million people in OECD countries), which are, paradoxically,
important in economies with very high levels of unemployment benefits, such as
Germany or the Netherlands. One needs to identify a different variable of the
welfare regime that accounts for the differences in the mix between
unemployment and non-employment across OECD countries.  My analysis will
focus on different structural variables of the welfare regime in order to account
for these differences in labor market outcomes: (a) the mode of financing of the
social benefits and (b) structural relationship between social policies, in
particular the relationship between sickness and invalidity benefits and
unemployment benefits. Both influence the  relative costs between
unemployment and alternative forms of non-employment faced by firms.
First, the mode of financing of social benefits (i.e. contributory or financed
through general taxation) influences the costs of open unemployment (that is a
consequence of layoffs) faced by firms. In contributory systems of insurance (or
conservative welfare regimes) the cost of open unemployment to firms is higher
than in non-contributory systems of social policy (universalistic welfare states).
This increase in the cost of unemployment to firms reinforces the tendency of
firms in these economies not to rely on the external labor markets during
periods of economic downturns.
The second structural variable of welfare regimes, which influences the
choices between unemployment and other forms of non-employment available
to firms are, as Blondal and Pearson have pointed out, the level (and
conditions) of invalidity and sickness benefits and the relationship of invalidity
and sickness benefits to unemployment benefits. If high sickness and invalidity
benefits exist, firms will turn to these policy instruments in order to develop the
early retirement ‘pathway’
24 as an alternative to layoffs and will prefer to use
social policy instruments to subsidize different forms of non-employment as
functional equivalents of unemployment. The growth in the use of firms of
sickness and invalidity benefits in a large number of conservative welfare
regimes (such as Germany and the Netherlands) will lower the level of
unemployment and will lead to a higher level of early retirement and a different
mix in the level of labor force participation rates/unemployment rates.
25 In
                                                                                                                                                                         
24 The concept of pathway was developed by the authors of the comparative study of early retirement. Kohli et.al., eds.,
1991, Time for Retirement: Comparative Studies of Early Exit from the Labor Force, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.  “A pathway is an institutional arrangement or in most cases a combination of different institutional
arrangements that are sequentially linked to manage the transition process, that is the period between exit from work
and entry into the normal old-age pension system. [...] Pathways consist of sequences of institutional programs, with
rule providing by a specific program to be followed by a specific second, and third etc.” p. 6
25 Blondal, Sveinbjorn and Pearson, Mark, Unemployment and other non-employment benefits, Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 1995, 11:1, p. 136.13
France, on the other hand, given the low levels of disability benefits as
compared to unemployment benefits, early retirement has been achieved
through the use of unemployment compensation.
Given these constraints faced by firms in coordinated market economies
with conservative welfare regimes, one expects to find in this institutional
environment the most innovative use by firms of different social policies that
represent alternatives to reliance on the external labor market during periods of
structural decline of industries of for the purpose of enterprise adjustment.
Flexibility during periods of economic downturns is achieved by the use of a
number of the instruments of the welfare state: (1) early retirement policies are
used by firms to achieve flexibility financed by general taxation; (2)
unemployment benefits are paid directly to firms who use it to subsidize short-
term work; (3) employment security of employees can be maintained if
employment security regulations are linked to firms’ training practices.
Empirical evidence for the propositions developed above will be provided in
the next section. First, this institutional explanation that specifies the differential
constraints imposed on firms by the welfare state and the institutions of
business coordination can explain the widespread cross-national variation in
the success of employers’ attempts to weaken statutory provisions against
unfair dismissals. The variation in the success of labor market deregulation can
be understood, if the institutional logics of dismissal laws is disaggregated.
From the perspective of employees, employment security regulations serve a
‘decommodifying’
26 role: they undo some of the power inequality of the
employment contract, by weakening the possibility of an unjust termination of
the labor contract. From the perspective of employers, dismissal laws are an
instrument that decrease turnover rate and that protect their investment in skills:
a necessary institutional prerequisite for long-term investment in the skills of
employees. The fact that in non-coordinated market economies these two
logics are not linked increases the likelihood of employers’ success in
weakening of dismissal laws in these economies; in coordinated market
economies, given that a linkage between the ‘decommodifying’ and ‘economic’
functions of dismissal laws exists, employers will be less successful in
weakening  the social constraints on their enterprises
27.
                                                                                                                                                                         
26 On a similar interpretation of the decommodifying function of dismissal laws, see Mosley and Kruppe, 1992, op. cit.,
p. 11. “The principal historical rationale for unfair dismissal and related regulations creating quasi ‘property-rights’ in
employment relationships has been equity considerations -- within the context of the post-World War II social contract
with its partial ‘decommodification’ of the factor labor.”
27 Also, existing surveys of employers in coordinated market economies (in particular Germany) have found that
employers are less likely to regard employment security regulations as a major constraint. For example, the largest
study on the impact of employment security commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Economic and Social
Affairs during the early 1980’s found that “most German firms do not regard employment protection regulations as a
major constraint.” Falke, et. al., eds., 1981, Kündigungspraxis und Kündigungsschutz in der Bundesrepublik,
Forschungsbericht no. 47, Bonn. A wave of interviews conducted among German employers during the late 1980’s
found that “77% of managers interviewed asserted that employment protection regulations were not a major obstacle to
workforce reduction.” Büchtemann and Höland, 1989, Befristete Arbeitsverträge nach dem14
The second broad strategy of reliance on social policies available to
enterprises in coordinated market economies have been general policies that
subsidize ‘participation in work’. Known as ‘work-sharing’ or short-time work,
most of these policies use unemployment benefits to subsidize participation in
work and to affect changes in the working hours of their employees, instead of
relying on layoffs.  In Germany, the use of short-time work as a social policy
instrument used by firms has risen dramatically during the 1980’s, but has
slowly decreased during the 1990’s, an outcome made possible by the
numerous changes in the regulations concerning the conditions under which
firms can make use of these unemployment benefits. Among these changes,
which I will describe in the empirical part, the most significant is a decision of
the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) in 1986 that allowed firms to
make use of short-time work benefits, even if the majority of jobs could not be
saved as a result of the reorganization of the enterprise.
The third alternative social policy instrument is early retirement. My analysis
will focus on the mechanisms through which early retirement was achieved by
firms, with a particular emphasis on the political process of redefinition of
existing policy instruments an of old age as risk. The availability of this early
retirement option has allowed firms in these economies to shift the burden of
adjustment and restructuration to the state. This explanation of the rapid growth
in early retirement that focuses on the active role played by firms in explaining
this dramatic social policy innovation during the 1980’s differs in several
respects from the welfare regime explanation that hypothesized an abstract
institutional logic of welfare regimes
28. According to Gøsta Esping Andersen,
early retirement should be highest in conservative welfare regimes, because
these regimes do not aim at maximizing total labor force participation. These
analyses, while convincing for the purpose of broad macro-comparisons fails to
identify the political dynamics behind this rapid increase in early retirement:
unions acceptance of the new trade-off wage demands/early retirement; the
acceptance by the state of its role to subsidize firm-level adjustment through a
reinterpretation of some of the institutions that were created to guarantee full
employment and fails to distinguish among the different policies (pathways)
through which early retirement was achieved (sickness and disability pensions,
unemployment insurance and disability benefits).
                                                                                                                                                                         
Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz 1985, Forschungsberichte no. 183, results quoted in Mosley and Kruppe, op. cit., p.
87.
28 On this position, see Gøsta Esping Andersen, 1990, op. cit., p. 148; Gøsta Esping Andersen and Jon Eivind Kolberg,
Welfare States and Employment Regimes, pp. 14-15, in Kolberg, Jan Eivind, ed., 1992a, Between Work and Social
Citizenship, London: Sharpe; Kolberg, Jon Eivind, ed., 1992b, The Study of Welfare State Regimes, London: Sharpe.15
4. APPLYING THE MODEL: A COMPARISON OF GERMANY AND
FRANCE
In the next part, I will present evidence supporting the theoretical propositions
outlined above that predict differential adjustment of firms, based on differences
in the access to the instruments of the welfare state. While in this paper, the
focus will be on the ‘institutional evidence’ tracing the changes in three policy
areas: dismissal laws, short-time work, early retirement, the statistical evidence
that assesses the impact of these labor market frameworks on employment
patterns and labor market adjustment -- and that analyzes the stratificational
outcomes within the different institutional environments -- will be presented
elsewhere.
4. 1. Labor Market deregulation: differential success.
During the 1980’s, in both France and Germany, dismissal laws came under
strong attacks of organized employers. The prescriptions of the OECD
‘flexibility’ reports were widely embraced
29 and the social policy principles
embodied in the statutory dismissal regulations came under attacks that
critiqued the high social constraints imposed  by the existing labor legislation on
the adjustment process of enterprises. However, the success of the attempts of
employers and policy-makers to weaken dismissal laws varied across the two
national contexts: while French employers succeeded in abolishing the
administrative authorization of dismissals, German employers were unable to
influence a major change in the legislation of employment protection. The
explanation of this differential success that I will propose is based on the
different mode in which the ‘social’ (decommodifying) and ‘economic’ functions
of dismissal laws were linked in the two different institutional contexts.
First, differences in the historical evolution of  social protection against
dismissal in both countries sheds some light on the different mode in which
employment protection laws mediated between the needs of enterprises to
retain skilled employees and the ‘decommodifying’ demands of employees for
protection against the risk of sudden termination of the employment contract. In
Germany, regulations against unfair dismissal originated during the 1920’s, as a
                                                          
29 See, for example, the collection of articles edited by Christoph F. Büchtemann and Helmut Neumann, 1990, Mehr
Arbeit durch weniger Recht? Chancen und Risiken der Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung, Berlin: Sigma, especially the
contributions by Schellhaas, Neumann, Muckenberger etc. For France, see the study undertaken by the Conseil
National du Patronat Français in 1984, concluding that “through the abolition of certain regulatory constraints and
parafiscal taxes, additional 471,000 jobs could be created in the following year.” Study is quoted in Maurau, op. cit., p.
360.16
result of a cross-class alliance
30 between employers and employees.
31 Tight
labor markets and fear of loss of high-skilled workers were the most important
considerations that led employers accept a number of progressive social policy
principles, embodied in a number of legislative decrees of the period, among
others the Works Council Act of 1920 and the Labor Tribunal Act of 1926. The
harshness of ‘social’ constraints on German enterprises is remarkable from a
comparative viewpoint: a dismissal could be found as justified only if it
represented a “necessary hardship (Härte) that was not caused by the behavior
of the employers or by the conditions of the enterprise.”
32
In France, on the other hand, statutory provisions against unfair dismissals
were enacted as a consequence of the strike-waves of 1968 and they do not
share the long history of cross-class alliance between employers and
employees that has characterized German employment security legislation. The
1973 unfair dismissal regulations required ‘well-founded and serious causes’ of
initiation of dismissals by employers and the obligation of employers to offer
employees (that had been employed for a period longer than two years) the
possibility of retraining (Convention de Conversion) if dismissed for reasons of
redundancy. Employers were required to pay the dismissed workers
compensation equal to six months earnings and pay to the Unemployment
Insurance Fund (ASSEDIC) for the benefits drawn by the employee for a period
of six months. In case of collective redundancies, consultation with works
councils (comité d’entreprise) defined the selection criteria for dismissals (such
as job tenure, family conditions, age etc.) and if dismissals affect more than ten
employees the negotiation of ‘social plans’ was mandatory.
The second difference between dismissal laws across the two cases
consists in the character of the public intervention in the labor market. The
degree of discretionary authority of the French state was much higher than in
Germany, and is one of the major causes of the frustration of the Conseil
National du Patronat Français (CNPF) with the existing system of employment
protection.  In France, a requirement of public authorization of all redundancies
(Authorization Administrative) was introduced by the conservative government
of Chirac in 1975, a measure by which the government attempted to exert a
significant degree of public control over the pace, scope and selection of
different redundancies. Germany, avoided the pitfalls of this ad-hoc and
random public intervention in the operation of the labor market and over firms’
                                                          
30 The cross-class alliance explanation which was developed to account for the origin of centralized wage-bargaining,
is, certainly applicable to a number of other institutions that emerged during the inter-war period. See Swenson, Peter,
1991, Bringing Capital Back In or Social Democracy Reconsidered, World Politics, 23:4.
31 My account of the origin and development of German dismissal law is primarily based on a number of legal
interpretations. I have primarily relied on Weller, Bernhard, 1969, Arbeitslosigkeit und Arbeitsrecht, Stuttgart: Gustav
Fischer, pp. 62- 74; Preis, Ulrich, 1987, Prinzipien des Kundigungsrechtes bei Arbeitsverhaltnissen, München: Beck,
Birk, Rolf, 1994, Protection against unfair dismissal in Germany: Historical Evolution and Legal Regulation, in
Buchtemann, Christoph, ed., 1994, op. cit.
32 Paragraph 84, Absatz 1 of Betriebsratsgesetz of 1920, quoted in Preis, op. cit., p. 15.17
employment practices through the high degree of ‘juridification’ of employment
laws, which paradoxically, rendered the social criteria which restructuring
enterprises had to consider as more transparent.
The third difference among employment protection laws results from their
different relationships to the environment of skill formation that supported
different strategies of firm level training. In the German context, a strong
institutional linkage exists between the institutions of skill formation and
dismissal laws. Given the fact that the German system of vocational training
leads to the acquisition of general skills, that were transferable across firms
33,
employers were reluctant to dismantle the protective regulatory environment
that prevented mobility of workers across firms. In France, on the other hand,
the absence of a system of training providing workers with general, transferable
skills similar to the German dual system, had as its consequence a large
percentage of semi-skilled workers (ouvrier specialisé) as percentage of total
industrial workforce (based on some estimations, the semi-skilled workers
account for 60 % of all manufacturing workers)
34. Vast differences between the
French and German understanding of skill exist: in France “multi-skilled workers
are workers with experience in several jobs, not workers with a relatively
abstract understanding of the production process, most of them would qualified
as semi-skilled in Germany.”
35 As a result of the different understandings of
skills in the two contexts, the possibility of an increase in turnover rates and
inter-firm mobility of workers, the predictable consequence of the weakening of
dismissal laws was less of a threat to French employers.
The weakening of the dismissal laws proceeded with different degrees of
speed and intensity during the 1980’s. In Germany, the changes introduced to
the employment protection act were minimal and with no major consequences.
A first change, introduced in  1985 relaxed the restrictions on firms’ use of fixed
contracts. Until 1985, Federal Labor Courts had ruled out ‘economic
uncertainty’ as a legitimate justification for the use of fixed-term contracts
36;
these legislative changes introduced in 1985 intended to undermine these
rulings with the hope “that firms would be induced to hire additional workers
rather than paying overtime work to their core work forces.”
37 The second
                                                          
33 Franz, Wolfgang and Soskice, David, 1994, The German Apprenticeship System, mimeo, Soskice, David, 1993,
Innovation Strategies of Companies: A comparative institutional explanation of cross-country differences, Paper
Presented at the Seminar on State and Capitalism since 1800, Harvard University, November 8th, 1993.
34 Hancke, Bob and Soskice, David, 1994, Market, State and Business Networks: Coordination in French Industry,
Paper presented at the seminar on European Political Economy and Institutional Analysis, Center for European
Studies, Harvard University, p. 8; Lane, Christel, 1989, Management and Labor In Europe, London: Edward Elgar. D’
Iribarne, A., 1995, The French Educational system: Regulatory Reform and Institutional Setting, in Buechtemann, C.,
ed., 1995, Human Capital Investment and Economic Performance, NewYork: Praeger.
35 Hancke, Bob and Soskice, David, 1994, op. cit., p. 8 This particular illustration is borrowed from Maurice M. et.al,
1986, The Social Foundations of Industrial Power, Cambridge: MIT Press.
36 Buchtemann, Christoph F., op. cit., 1993, p. 286.
37 Ibid., p. 287.18
change has weakened the procedures which required the negotiation of ‘social
plans’ between works councils and employers
38.
In opposition to the incremental character of labor market deregulation in
Germany, all existing accounts of changes in French dismissal laws indicate
that “French labor market regulation of employment contract underwent a
fundamental transformation to relatively liberal”
39 and that “the dominant theory
has shifted from being protective to being more transactional.”
40 Several
developments need to be highlighted. The most significant policy change
abolished the requirement of administrative approval of dismissals.  The Chirac
II government, gave in to the vocal complaints of the Conseil National du
Patronat Français and removed the Authorisation Administrative in 1986.
Second, regulations allowing the use of part-time work by firms were further
liberalized in 1986, by an Ordinance and a Presidential Decree of the same
year
41.  In this case, liberalization consisted in an ‘expansion’ of the
justifications employers can legally use in order to hire temporary workers and
in the lengthening of the maximum duration for part-time work from 12 to 24
months. Third, regulations facilitating adjustment in working hours, in particular
‘flexibility’ in working time were introduced in 1987
42.
While Germany and France have started from a position of comparable
degree of stringency in their dismissal laws (see Table 1), the reforms of the
employment protection legislation, initiated by policy-makers as a response to
similar pressures exerted by organized employers, have varied in their scope
and degree of success during the 1980’s. As I have argued, the explanation of
this variation lies in the absence of link between the social and economic
functions of dismissal laws in France, which has permitted labor market
deregulation to be more far-reaching in the France. I will now turn to the
analysis of  the labor market adjustment of firms and to an analysis of firms’
reliance on the welfare state for adjustment.
                                                          
38 Based on the old regulations, if at least 5% of the employees within one firm were affected, social plans had to be
negotiated in cases of redundancies due to rationalization. The new threshold have been raised for redundancies
affecting 20% of all firms’ employees. Source, Mosley and Kruppe, op. cit., 1992, p. 85.
39 Mosley and Kruppe, op.cit., p. 72.
40 Maurau, Guy op. cit., p. 359.
41 Ordinance of August 11, 1986 and Presidential Decree no. 85-399 of April 3, 1986.
42 June 19, 1987.19
4. 2. The development of short-time work during the 1980’s.
The low degree of success of labor market deregulation in the German case
has left the employment practices of German firms, which are characterized by
long job tenures, low inter-firm mobility of workers and low reliance on the
external labor market during periods of economic downturns, fundamentally
unaltered. However, the continuation of these employment practices has been
facilitated by firms’ reliance on the instruments of the welfare state: in order to
avoid the reliance on the external labor market during periods of business
cycles downturns or periods of industry adjustment, firms have, increasingly,
turned to existing instruments of social policy and, by the reinterpretation of
existing provisions and by the legal reformulation of older policies, firms
adjustment has contributed to changes in social policy itself.  .
An important policy instrument increasingly used by German firms during
the 1980’s as a substitute for relying on the external labor markets during
periods of economic downturns was short-time work. The policy instrument of
short-time work consists of firms’ use of subsidies paid by the Federal
Employment Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) -- from a fund to which both
employers and employees contribute -- during periods of adjustment and
reorganization. Under this program, an employee whose working-time has been
reduced can collect unemployment insurance benefits to which the would have
been entitled if unemployed
43. Although the limited character of this policy
instrument was recognized by unions and works-councils, short-time work
became, nevertheless, a widely accepted policy instrument, offering employees
with very specific firm-level skills the possibility of retraining prior to dismissals
and it postponed dismissals as a labor-market option of enterprises, facilitating
internal adjustment.  For employers, short-time work lowered the transaction
costs associated with job searches and permitted the continuation of
employment relationships for employees with high specific firm-level training. A
number of existing estimations of the costs of short-time work to the relevant
actors, have pointed out that by financing short-time benefits the Federal
Employment Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) has incurred lower costs per
employee receiving short-time benefits, than it would have incurred if would
have financed full unemployment benefits
44. 
Short-time work as a social policy instrument used by firms has risen
dramatically during the 1980’s and leveled of during the 1990’s. Its use shows a
strong variation by industry and is affected by the structural adjustment of the
                                                          
43 For an overview of the system, see Flechsenhar, 1980, Kurzarbeit als Maßnahme der betrieblichen Anpassung,
Frankfurt: Harri Deutsch; Neumann, Manfred, 1984, Arbeitszeitverkürzung gegen Arbeitslosigkeit; Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, Wirtschaftspolitische Kolloquien der Adolf Weber Stiftung.
44 Bruche, G., Reissert, B., 1985, Die Finanzierung der Arbeitsmarktpolitik, System, Effektivitat, Reformansatze,
Franfurt: Campus, p. 107.20
particular industry. This change has been facilitated by a dynamic
transformation of a number of social policy regulations (in particular, the
Employment Protection Act) concerning the conditions of access of particular
industries to this social policy instrument, the length of its use, and the
relationship between short-time work and standard employment. 
One trend in the changes of the regulatory environment has been the
lengthening of the time during which firms can make use of short-time work,
leading to a maximal period of 36 months in 1983. Second, following a decision
of the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) of 1986, the broad terms
under which firms can make use of  short-time work have changed. This
decision allowed firms to make use of short-time work, even if the majority of
jobs could not be saved and the interruption in the contributions of employers
and employees to the social security system were not temporary. The third
broad tendency was a sectoral expansion of short-term benefits, from severely
affected sectors (such as steel) and sectors affected by strong seasonal
variations (constructions) to all sectors, if appropriate training measures are
offered by the employers.21
TABLE 4
Selected Changes of Legislation affecting short-time work in Germany
45
1981 Consolidation-Law of Employment Protection Act. Restriction upon the
use of short-time  work by enterprises which use overtime in other sections.
1983 As a complement to EU measures that attempt to compensate for the
crisis of the steel industry, enterprises in the steel industry are given the
possibility to make use of short-time work up to 36 months.
1983 Restriction on the use of short-time work by Mittelstand- and Handwerk
firms (which claimed short-time benefits for their trainees.
1987 Enterprises in steel and mining can claim short-time benefits (steel
industry for up to 36 months during 1987-1989). The preservation of the job of
short-time workers is no longer necessary as a precondition for the receipt of
short-time benefits. Extension of short-time benefits to sectors that undergo
strong seasonal variations in employment levels (such as construction).
1988 Change of Employment Promotion Act facilitating a ‘flexible transition
towards retirement’. Employers cannot claim short-time work benefits for
employees older than 63.
1989 Possibility of long-term use of short-time benefits is extended to other
industries, besides steel and mining, if these measures avoid the notification of
dismissals, but employers are required to undertake appropriate retraining
measures for employees receiving these benefits.
                                                          
45 Source: Niesel, Klaus, et.al, eds, 1995, Kommentar zum Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, München: Beck; Knigge, Arnold,
ed., 1984, Kommentar zum Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, Baden-Baden: Nomos; Holzmayer, Werner, 1989,
Kurzarbeitergeld und Schlechtwettergeld: ein entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Vergleich, Rheinfelden: Schauble; Linke,
Lothar, 1993, Kurzarbeit im Strukturwandel, Discussion Paper FS I-93- 206, Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung
Berlin.22
In opposition to Germany, in France short-time work has been a more limited
policy instrument. This difference can be, in part explained as a consequence
of a greater reliance of French firms on fixed-term contracts
46 than German
firms. French labor market programs have emphasized ‘external’ adjustment of
firms, as opposed to the internal adjustment facilitated by German social
policies. The congé de conversion
47 (introduced in 1980 for adjustment of firms
in steel and ship-building and extended later to all large firms which initiate
collective dismissals) is a policy instrument that requires employers to provide
for training for redundant workers who remain employees of the firm during the
period of training
48.
4. 3. The Development of Early Retirement.
The availability of early retirement to restructuring firms (in fact, firms’ active
role in devising new possibilities of exit for older workers, by ‘recombining’
available policy instruments) and the radical changes in male labor force
participation rates in several European countries during the past years are
social policy developments that have allowed enterprises to shift some of the
burden of adjustment and restructuring to the state. In this brief overview of the
development of early retirement in France and Germany, I will focus on two
distinct policy mechanisms: (1) policy instruments which have complemented
the ‘traditional’ old age pensions as compensation for retiring older employees
and (2) the changing arena where the definition of the boundary between
working age and retirement took place: by shifting back and forth between the
state and the social actors it had as its consequence the acceleration of the
‘downward spiral’ in the exit age from the labor force.
In terms of labor market outcomes -- male labor force participation rates
age 55-65 -- Germany and France are comparable. In comparative terms, both
countries are situated at an extreme point with respect to the other OECD
countries, where a similar, but less dramatic decline has also been in place.
Male labor force participation rates (age 55-64) have declined in both countries,
more dramatically in France than in Germany: from 75.4% in 1970 to 50.1% in
1985 in France and from 80.1% in 1970 to 57.0% in 1985 in Germany.
49 If one
                                                          
46 Based on European Labor Force Survey Results, existing studies have attempted to compute cross-national indexes
measuring the incidence of fixed-term contracts. France, Spain and Portugal are above the European average, while
Germany, Belgium and the UK are well below. Source, Mosley and Kruppe, 1992, op. cit., p. 35.
47 The convention de conversion (mentioned above) is a different program, requiring training in the case of individual
redundancies. The degree of involvement of the state is much greater, however, in the case of the congé de
conversion. Mosley and Kruppe, op. cit., p. 76.
48 For an evaluation of these policies see, for example Lessons in restructuring: the French experience, 1992, US
Congress: Washington, D.C.
49 Source: OECD Employment Outlook, Paris: OECD, various years.23
disaggregates these figures by age groups, the decline in labor force
participation rates is particular sharp for the 60-64 age group, where the decline
was from 68.0% in 1970 to 25.4% in 1988 in France and from 71.8% in 1970 to
31.5% in 1988 in Germany
50.
The policy instruments through which early retirement was achieved in
France and Germany differed, and, are a consequence of the different
relationship that exists between unemployment and disability benefits in the two
welfare states. In France, exit of older workers from the labor market was
achieved primarily via the unemployment insurance ‘subsystem’ of the welfare
state, while in Germany exit was made possible through a combination of
disability and unemployment benefits.
In France an Unemployment Compensation Fund, based on contributions
of employers and employees, was set up as early as 1972, providing for
guaranteed income benefits for older workers who had been dismissed prior to
the retirement age of 65. A change introduced in 1977 made possible for
resigned workers to receive guaranteed income benefits, called guarantie de
ressources démission. These administrative changes led to a vast decrease in
the labor force participation rates of males age 60-65 and to “the emergence of
a new phase of life, called pre-retirement (préretraite) between the time they
stopped working and the time they received an old-age pension.”
51 The
expectations of ‘pre-retirement benefits’ affected, however the labor market
status of workers in the 54-59 age group, among which unemployment rose
dramatically. To compensate for this situation, in 1980, the National
Employment Fund established a special allocation (allocation speciale) for pre-
retirement at age 56 or 55.
52
A new early retirement-package targeted at the age group 55-59 was
established in 1982. As part of this program, the state agreed to pay a large
proportion of the benefits to pre-retired workers (called allocation conventionelle
de solidarité) if the firm would, in return, hire a new worker to replaced the
retired employee. While the intention of the state was to regain control over the
process of early retirement which had ‘drifted’ beyond the state’s control and
had become part of a series of ad-hoc, case-by-case negotiations among the
social partners, the effect of the ‘Pre-retirement’ policy was that the state took
over a large amount of the costs associated with early retirement, further
overburdening its finances.
                                                                                                                                                                         
50 Source, Jacobs et. al., 1991, The evolution of early exit: A comparative Analysis of labor force participation patterns,
p. 56. in Kohli, et.al., op. cit., 1991.
51 Guillemard, 1991, op. cit., p. 139.
52 Guillemard, 1991, op.cit., p. 141.24
In Germany, disability pensions were a significant policy instrument
contributing to early retirement. A number of decisions of the Federal Social
Court
53 have changed the notion of ‘disability’ as an administrative category
54
and have widened the understanding of disability beyond the strict medical
definition, facilitating the use of disability pensions by older workers. The
decision of the court made it possible for older workers to receive full disability
pensions, if no part-time jobs were available and has, in particular, affected the
population in the age-group 55-59
55 (whose proportion classified as disabled
doubled). In addition, the age limit of pensions for handicapped persons was
lowered to 60 years in 1980.
Changes in the conditions governing the receipt of unemployment benefits
affected the labor force participation rates of older employees. Given that the
risk of unemployment was heavily concentrated among elderly workers (the
length of unemployment spells and the percentage of long-term unemployment
of total unemployment was higher in these age groups), special rules governing
the receipt of unemployment benefits were developed for this age group. First,
the maximum length of benefits of the contributory unemployment benefits
(Arbeitslosengeld) was extended for elderly workers from 12 to 18 months (for
the unemployed older than 49) and, in 1986, to 32 months for unemployed over
the age of 54. Pension benefits are available at age 60, if unemployment had
persisted for at least one year.
Third, early retirement was achieved as a result of the introduction of
supplementary legislation which required, for its implementation, institutional
support through collective agreements among the social partners. In particular,
the Vorruhestandsgesetz (Pre-Retirement Act) that was in effect starting with
1984
56 provided a ‘pre-retirement’ pension starting with the age of 58. Part of
the pension benefits were subsidized by the Bundesanstalt, if the employer
replaced the older employee with an unemployed. The similarity between the
German Pre-Retirement Act and the French ‘Solidarity Contract’ is based on
the fact that the deliberate use by the state of social policy with the goal of
stimulating the hiring behavior of firms (by paying significant contributions to
enterprises, ‘in exchange’ for the latter’s ‘separation’ from older workers) -- a
                                                          
53See Berufsunfähigkeit bei Teilzeitarbeit, in Entscheidungen des Bundessozialgerichtes, Band 30, Köln: Carl
Heymans, pp. 166- 209.
54 On the construction of disability as an administrative category in the German welfare state, see Deborah Stone,
1984, The Disabled State, Philadelphia: Temple University Press; pp. 29-89; Florian Tennstedt, 1972,
Berufsunfähigkeit im Sozialrecht, Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.
55 Jacobs, et.al., op. cit., p. 188.
56 See Gesetz zur Erleichterung des Übergangs vom Arbeitsleben in den Ruhestand, 13. April 1984, in Das Deutsh
Bundesrecht, 519. Lieferung, Mai 1984. On the preretirement act, see Kohli, Martin et.al., 1989, Je früher - desto
besser? Die Verkürzung des Erwerbelebens am Beispiel des Vorruhestandes in der chemischen Industrie, Berlin:
Sigma, pp. 10-25 for overview of the legal framework; Naegele, Gerhard, ed., 1987, Theorie und Praxis des
Vorruhestandsgesetzes: Ergebnisse einer emprischen Wirkungsstudie, Augsburg: Maro-Verlag, 1987; pp. 7-67.25
‘new’ usage of social policy which blurs the institutionalized distinction between
the ‘social policy’ and the ‘labor market’ policy functions of the welfare state
57.
4. 3. 1. Control over boundary between work and retirement: Welfare State or
Firms?
The second significant policy development that has contributed to the sharp
decline in labor force participation rates of older employees was the changing
arena of definition of  ‘retirement’ age. The shift the place where the boundary
between work and retirement is ‘defined’ --away from the social security system
(and the general pension system) -- has further increased the ability of firms to
use the welfare state for the purposes of enterprise rationalization. 
Based on the social security systems in France and Germany, the ‘official’
retirement age was age 65 in both France
58 and Germany
59. The unchallenged
premise of the postwar settlement was that this function remained an
uncontested prerogative of the welfare state was undermined by firms’ active
involvement in social policy development.
In Germany, a reform of the pension system introduced as early as 1957
made retirement at age 60 instead of 65 possible for older workers, if prior to
this period, unemployment had persisted for at least one year. Given the
favorable labor market situation, for most of the post-war period, neither
employers, nor employees had incentives to make use of this provision. Once
the labor market began to deteriorate (in the aftermath of the second oil shock)
this policy instrument was ‘discovered’ by firms as a very attractive alternative
to the brutality of dismissals for older and ‘expensive’ workers who had spent
most of their lives within the same enterprise. Given that unemployment
assistance was available for 36 months, the use of this provision had the effect
of further lowering the retirement age to 57 years
60.
In France, an unintended consequence of the establishment of the
Unemployment Fund in was that it rendered the ‘official’ retirement age of the
                                                          
57 On the importance of this distinction within the German welfare state (‘Sozialpolitik’ and ‘Arbeitsmarktpolitik’) and on
the effects of the blurring of these boundaries, see Schön Donald A. and Rein, Martin, 1994, Frame Reflection:
Towards the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies, New York: Basic Books, p. 65. “The most striking
characteristic of the first stage of the early retirement-story was a blurring of the lines between social protection and
labor market policies. [...] As a recent OECD report has noted, “the deterioration of the labor market itself played an
important role in increasing the importance of the ‘alien’ claims upon the pension system.”
58 For overviews of the French pension system, see Guillemard, Anne Marie, 1980, La vieillesse et l’Etat, Paris: PUF.
59 For overviews of the structure of the German pension system, see inter alia, Nullmeier, Frank and Rub, Friedbert,
1993, Die Transformation der Sozialpolitik: Vom Sozialstaat zum Sicherungsstaat, Frankfurt: Campus, Ch. 2.2. Die
Policy-Prinzipien der Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung, pp. 93- 117.
60 The workers could claim unemployment benefits for three years, and then claim this suuplementary pension for five
years, until they became eligible for the social-security benefits.26
social security system (age 65) ineffectual as a boundary between working life
and old age and shifted the locus of negotiation of the boundary to the social
actors: employers, unions, enterprises. In 1983, the socialist government
attempted to respond to these developments and recapture the prerogative to
define old age. It ‘reestablished’ the retirement age at 60, for workers that had
contributed to the Social Security Old-Age fund for at least 37.5 years, without
realizing that the pre-retirement program (Contrat de solidarité) that had been
established in 1982 had precisely the consequence of undermining this policy.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has attempted to analyze the dynamics of institutional and social
policy development in three arenas of social policy: early retirement, short-time
work and regulations guaranteeing employment security, by arguing for the
need to view the institutional interdependence between these policy areas.
Neither economistic arguments that have characterized these developments as
a form of ‘labor market deregulation’ nor welfare state models that hypothesize
invisible logics of welfare state-labor market interactions can adequatly capture
the political dynamics behind these social policy developments. I have argued
that one needs to construct a unitary model that specifies the complex
interactions that exist between the institutions of skill formation and the welfare
regimes and the constraints that these institutions place on the adjustment
strategies of firms
61 in a particular political economy.
The analysis of this paper provides, simultaneously, an explanation for the
problems of labor market segmentation and labor market dualisms which have
become the most problematic labor market issues facing European economies
during the 1980’s. By focusing on firms’ involvement in social policy
development, I highlight additional political mechanisms through which these
labor market dualisms and the new forms of ‘non-employment’ and labor
market non-participation came about. The ability of firms to use the welfare
state for the purpose of enterprise reorganization and to ‘reinterpret’ some of
the traditional provisions of the welfare state is a development with wider
implications which has, in part, undermined a number of the ‘assumptions’ of
                                                          
61 This follows the research program outlined in Hall, Peter, A., 1994, The Comparative Political Economy of Europe in
an Era of Interdependence, Paper presented at Seminar on State and Capitalism since 1800, Harvard University. Peter
Hall suggests that the problem of ‘adjustment’, broadly encompassing ‘cyclical adjustment’ (understood as ‘the
adjustment of the economy to exogenous shocks’), ‘sectoral adjustment’ (‘transfer of resources from sectors that are
relatively uncompetitive in international terms to those where a compararative adjustment can be exploited’) and
‘structural adjustment’ (understood as ‘adjustment to new ways of organizing productive activity so as to take
advantage of rapid technological change and more flexible ways of organizing work and economic transactions.) should
be the focus (‘dependent variable’) of political economists and replace the existing ‘static’ dependent variables of
current studies that have focused on rates of inflation, growth or unemployment. pp. 27-28.27
the post-war consensus -- in particular the assumption of an institutionalized
boundary between social and labor market policies.28
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